A vessel without a pilot: Bodily and affective experience in the Cotard delusion of inexistence

Mind and Language 38 (4):1059-1080 (2022)
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Abstract

The initial cause of Cotard delusion is pervasive dyshomeostasis (dysregulation of basic bodily function).This explanation draws on interoceptive active inference account of self‐representation. In this framework, the self is an hierarchical predictive model made by the brain to facilitate homeostatic regulation. The account I provide is an alternative to two factor accounts of the Cotard delusion that treat depersonalisation experience as the first factor in genesis of the Cotard delusion. I argue that depersonalisation experience and the Cotard delusion are produced by different breakdowns in the process of self‐modelling.

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Philip Gerrans
University of Adelaide

Citations of this work

The feeling of being alive: phenomenology and biology.Thomas Fuchs - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-27.
Against the Pathology Argument for Self-Acquaintance.Adam Bradley - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):641-657.

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References found in this work

The Predictive Mind.Jakob Hohwy - 2013 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
The philosophical writings of Descartes.René Descartes - 1984 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Meditations on First Philosophy.René Descartes - 1641/1984 - New York: Caravan Books. Edited by Stanley Tweyman.
Interoceptive inference, emotion, and the embodied self.Anil K. Seth - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (11):565-573.

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