Change and Its Sources

Review of Metaphysics 12 (3):333-351 (1959)
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Abstract

Change is one of experience's most evident data. The man who has finished reading is different from the same man before he started; the book he has read was once a tree. But if the fact is clear, it hides a very profound problem. Examining change, we see from experience that things do not come to be out of nothing; other things turn into them. The principle of sufficient reason confirms this, since a pure negation can never be a sufficient reason for anything. But if this is true, then neither can the negation of an attribute provide a sufficient reason for its emergence in an already existing thing; this would be tantamount to saying that the attribute came from nothing. Nor, if the thing really changes, can we say simply that an external agent "pours in" some of its perfection, since then it would not change, but only receive a metaphysical coat of paint. And so, we seem to have forced ourselves into a dilemma: things must be what they are, and yet they must themselves be in some sense what they are not. If we deny the first part there is nothing to change; if the second, change is unintelligible, and hence impossible.

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