Galileo and the indispensability of scientific thought experiment

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):397-424 (1998)
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Abstract

By carefully examining one of the most famous thought experiments in the history of science—that by which Galileo is said to have refuted the Aristotelian theory that heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones—I attempt to show that thought experiments play a distinctive role in scientific inquiry. Reasoning about particular entities within the context of an imaginary scenario can lead to rationally justified concluusions that—given the same initial information—would not be rationally justifiable on the basis of a straightforward argument.

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Tamar Gendler
Yale University

Citations of this work

How Imagination Informs.Joshua Myers - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):167-189.
Imagination.Shen-yi Liao & Tamar Gendler - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Productive Anarchy of Scientific Imagination.Michael T. Stuart - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (5):968-978.

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References found in this work

Mind and World.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (2):389-394.
Models and Analogies in Science.Mary B. Hesse - 1963 - [Notre Dame, Ind.]: University of Notre Dame Press.
The Logic of Scientific Discovery.K. Popper - 1959 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):55-57.
Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy.George Bealer - 1998 - In Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey, Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 201-240.

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