Abstract

Axel Gosseries argues for a radical intergenerational egalitarianism. His views imply that we should typically adopt a “pro-present” stance, prioritizing the here-and-now over the future. Theoretically, when compared to the pro-future stance of commonsense morality, Gosseries’s positions seem to shift the norms of intergenerational ethics significantly in favor of the current generation. Practically speaking, much rests on his assumption that the current generation will be the least well-off generation by comparison to its successors. I argue that there is a strong initial presumption against Gosseries’s views. Yet I also concede that the radical argument is relatively easy to make. Its roots are deeply embedded in the core values of contemporary ethical theory, namely justice and well-being. I show this by identifying “master arguments” for pro-present intergenerational transfers based on each value, and conclude that the task of resisting the radical, pro-present position will be difficult. In an effort to make progress, I sketch some logical space for three promising strategies: (i) appealing to embeddedness; (ii) defending pro-future norms; and (iii) opposing “jealous virtues”. Some key ideas include: a permissive interpretation of a Rawlsian difference principle; two touchstones for intergenerational ethics; and a reminder of limits that constrain core values. I close by briefly addressing Gosseries’s assumption that our generation is or contains the least well-off, and his resistance to historical climate justice. There I emphasize: the prominence of intergenerational threats; the implications of taking past generations to be the true intergenerational worse off; and the suspicion that we might fall into “lemon egalitarianism”.