Abstract

The article aims to analyze the relationship between the concept of intent defined by the theory of will in the context of criminal law and the conception of will be developed by Hans Kelsen's theory of legal positivism. The study explores the norm through an analysis of the Pure Theory of Law, emphasizing the distinction between "being" and "ought" in the legal context. From this distinction, the placement of law and the role of the fundamental hypothetical norm, used by Kelsen as an epistemological assumption and to ensure the validity of the entire legal system, will be investigated. In this theoretical context, using the deductive approach and monographic procedure, the concept of will in Kelsen's philosophy is brought closer to the concept of intent, seeking to infer whether the philosophy contributes characteristics that define intent as will, as defined by the theory of will. In conclusion, the characteristics of the concepts inherited from the philosophy of law in defining intent are found, especially through the relationship established between will and arbitrariness.