Empathy is Not a Thermometer

Philosophia 45 (3):861-866 (2017)
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Abstract

We raise two objections to Slote’s article. First, empathy cannot provide information about the world in the direct way Slote proposes. Emotional contagion might be able to do so, but this type of process is different from the empathic one. Second, even if we accept his view of empathy, his claim that we make moral judgments via empathizing with the ‘warmth’ or ‘coldness’ of the actor seems misguided because, we usually empathize with the patient, and we empathize with emotions, not “temperatures”.

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Author Profiles

Kyle Furlane
University of Toledo
Heidi L. Maibom
University of Cincinnati

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References found in this work

An argument for basic emotions.Paul Ekman - 1992 - Cognition and Emotion 6 (3):169-200.
The Nature of Sympathy.Max Scheler - 1954 - Transaction Publishers.
Moral Sentimentalism.Michael Slote - 2009 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
The Nature of Sympathy.Max Scheler, Peter Heath & W. Stark - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (4):671-673.

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