Abstract

: In this paper I argue that the return to subjectivity in certain areas of continental and analytic philosophy poses a serious challenge to Habermas’s postmetaphysical conception of communicative rationality. Drawing on the work of Dieter Henrich and Manfred Frank as well as arguments advanced by a number of analytic philosophers I attempt to show that Habermas’s critique of the philosophy of subjectivity is unjustified, that subjectivity takes priority over intersubjectivity, and that rationality needs to be grounded in epistemically normative pre-conceptual and pre-propositional capacities of the subject. The unity of reason to which Habermas is committed cannot be reduced to the unity of discursive forms of validation. A more encompassing concept of rationality can still be defended if it is anchored in a philosophy of subjectivity of the kind developed by German Idealists and prematurely rejected by Habermas.