On concept and object

Mind 60 (238):168-180 (1892)
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Abstract

Translation of Frege's 'Über Begriff und Gegenstand' (1892). Translation by Peter Geach, revised by Max Black.

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1951

DOI

10.1093/mind/lx.238.168

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reprint Frege, Gottlob (1951) "II.—On Concept and Object". Mind 60(238):168-180

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Citations of this work

Possibility of Metaphysics: Substance, Identity, and Time.E. J. Lowe - 2001 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
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A fictionalist theory of universals.Tim Button & Robert Trueman - 2024 - In Peter Fritz & Nicholas K. Jones, Higher-Order Metaphysics. Oxford University Press.
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