Why a believer could believe that God answers prayers

Sophia 48 (3):319-324 (2009)
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Abstract

In a previous issue of this journal Michael Veber argued that God could not answer certain prayers because doing so would be immoral. In this article I attempt to demonstrate that Veber’s argument is simply the logical problem of evil applied to a possible world. Because of this, his argument is susceptible to a Plantinga-style defense.

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W. Paul Franks
Tyndale University

References found in this work

The Nature of Necessity.Alvin Plantinga - 1974 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
Evil and omnipotence.J. L. Mackie - 1955 - Mind 64 (254):200-212.
Evil and omnipotence.J. L. Mackie - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas, Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.

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