Ascribing Intentionality

Behavior and Philosophy 37:217 - 222 (2009)
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Abstract

Much of the commentary on my paper "Intentional behaviorism" (Foxall, 2007) fails to make contact with my central arguments about the use of intentional language in the explanation of behavior. Marr's (2008) remarks on my responses to that commentary (Foxall, 2008) also fail to address my original assertions. Both commentary and remarks tilt at windmills that were not in the landscape I described or hinted at in the solutions I proposed. I attempt here to map out my argument more clearly

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References found in this work

Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Don Ross, David Spurrett & John G. Collier.
Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized.James Ladyman & Don Ross - 2007 - In James Ladyman & Don Ross, Every thing must go: metaphysics naturalized. New York: Oxford University Press.
Content and Consciousness.D. C. Dennett - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (18):604-604.
Are theories of learning necessary?B. F. Skinner - 1950 - Psychological Review 57 (4):193-216.

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