How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35 (1994)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Traditional analyses of the curve fitting problem maintain that the data do not indicate what form the fitted curve should take. Rather, this issue is said to be settled by prior probabilities, by simplicity, or by a background theory. In this paper, we describe a result due to Akaike [1973], which shows how the data can underwrite an inference concerning the curve's form based on an estimate of how predictively accurate it will be. We argue that this approach throws light on the theoretical virtues of parsimoniousness, unification, and non ad hocness, on the dispute about Bayesianism, and on empiricism and scientific realism. * Both of us gratefully acknowledge support from the Graduate School at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, and NSF grant DIR-8822278 (M.F.) and NSF grant SBE-9212294 (E.S.). Special thanks go to A. W. F. Edwards.William Harper. Martin Leckey. Brian Skyrms, and especially Peter Turney for helpful comments on an earlier draft.

Other Versions

No versions found

Similar books and articles

The curve fitting problem: A solution.Peter Turney - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4):509-530.
Inductive Inference and Stability.Peter David Turney - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Toronto (Canada)
Forster and Sober on the curve-fitting problem.André Kukla - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):248-252.
Curve-Fitting for Bayesians?Gordon Belot - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv061.
Simplicity.Nicholas Maxwell - 2000 - Philsci Archive.
A Philosopher’s Guide to Empirical Success.Malcolm R. Forster - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):588-600.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
897 (#63,474)

6 months
159 (#83,510)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Malcolm Forster
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Systematizing the theoretical virtues.Michael N. Keas - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2761-2793.
When is parsimony a virtue.Michael Huemer - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):216-236.
Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.

View all 309 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Book Reviews.M. L. G. Redhead - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Scientific reasoning: the Bayesian approach.Peter Urbach & Colin Howson - 1993 - Chicago: Open Court. Edited by Peter Urbach.
The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
Theory and Evidence.Clark N. Glymour - 1980 - Princeton University Press.

View all 41 references / Add more references