A Pragmatist Framework for Disagreeing Deeply

Informal Logic 46 (2):279-305 (2026)
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Abstract

In this paper, we argue that much of the recent discussion on deep disagreement is grounded in a semantic framework that fails to capture how the concept actually works. It overlooks a key point that we aim to emphasize: attributing _depth_ to a disagreement is, at its core, an evaluative act. Drawing on a pragmatist perspective, we propose a more refined framework that reveals how certain terms serve to express—or make explicit—the speaker’s attitudes and intentions in the act of speaking. We argue that this is exactly what occurs when depth is attributed to a disagreement.

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2026-07-01

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José Andrés Forero-Mora
Corporación Universitaria Minuto de Dios
Maria Jose Frapolli
University College London

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References found in this work

How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
A Spirit of Trust: A Reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology.Robert Brandom - 2019 - Cambridge, MA and London, England: Harvard University Press.
Just Words: On Speech and Hidden Harm.Mary Kate McGowan - 2019 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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