- New
-
Topics
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- Journals
- Submit material
- More
Brown and Moore's value invariabilism vs Dancy's variabilism
Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):162-168 (2010)
Abstract
Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.Author's Profile
Other Versions
No versions found
My notes
Similar books and articles
Two accounts of objective reasons. [REVIEW]Christian Piller - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):444–451.
Holism about value: some help for invariabilists.Daniel Halliday - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):1033-1046.
Missing the Target: Jonathan Dancy’s Conception of a Principled Ethics.Maike Albertzart - 2011 - Journal of Value Inquiry 45 (1):49-58.
Reason Holism, Individuation, and Embeddedness.Peter Shiu-Hwa Tsu - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1091-1103.
Review of Dancy's Moral Reasons. [REVIEW]Mark Van Roojen - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):118-120.
Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason.Errol Lord - 2007 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7.
A Particularist but Codifiable Virtue Ethics.Christine Swanton - 2015 - In Mark Timmons, Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics: Volume 5. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 38-63.
Analytics
Added to PP
2009-07-03
Downloads
1,153 (#44,182)
6 months
172 (#68,604)
2009-07-03
Downloads
1,153 (#44,182)
6 months
172 (#68,604)
Historical graph of downloads
Author's Profile
Citations of this work
Bare‐difference methodology and the scientific analogy.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):171-182.
Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):45-63.
Mereological Dominance and Simpson’s Paradox.Tung-Ying Wu - 2020 - Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 48 (1):391–404.
References found in this work
The Conception of Intrinsic Value.G. E. Moore - 1998 - In James Rachels, Ethical theory. New York: Oxford University Press.
Try MATCHA Writer if you're interested in citing directly from PhilPapers and certifying your authorship.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation