Free Will, Determinism, and Stoic Counsel

Ars Disputandi 7 (2007)
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Abstract

Stoic philosophy has been charged with an inconsistency insofar as its deterministic worldview appears to conflict with its advocacy of various methods of self-discipline aiming at self-improvement. It is, some claim, self-contradictory to hold persons responsible for adhering to counsel regarding their behavior and attitude if forces beyond their control ultimately determine that their behavior and attitude will not conform to counsel. In this paper, I argue that this complaint is misguided. Though several Stoic philosophers attempted to reconcile their determinism with some conception of free will, I contend that the Stoics should have rejected the doctrine of free will while defending Stoic counsel and its efficacy for producing a well-ordered mind, virtuous character, and a life of harmony with Nature

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