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Formal Causes: Definition, Explanation, and Primacy in Socratic and Aristotelian Thought
Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2013)
Abstract
Michael T. Ferejohn presents a new analysis of Aristotle's theory of explanation and scientific knowledge, in the context of its Socratic roots. Ferejohn shows how Aristotle resolves the tension between his commitment to the formal-case model of explanation and his recognition of the role of efficient causes in explaining natural phenomenaAuthor's Profile
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Citations of this work
Aristotle’s Definition of Scientific Knowledge.Lucas Angioni - 2016 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 19 (1):79-104.
Causality and Coextensiveness in Aristotle's Posterior Analytics 1.13.Lucas Angioni - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54:159-185.
Ontological Priority and Grounding in Aristotle's Categories.Riin Sirkel - 2024 - In Calvin G. Normore & Stephan Schmid, Grounding in Medieval Philosophy. Cham: Springer Nature Switzerland. pp. 33-63.
Aristóteles e a necessidade do conhecimento científico.Lucas Angioni - 2020 - Discurso 50 (2):193-238.
Aristotle on Demonstrative Knowledge: Particulars Included.Riin Sirkel - 2026 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.
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