CCA with Plural Harm

In Bad Things: The Nature and Normative Role of Harm. New York, US: OUP Usa. pp. 84-116 (2023)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses the problem of preemption for the counterfactual account of harm, and defends the plural harm approach as a solution. It defends a detailed account of harm, namely, CCA with Plural Harm, which provides necessary and sufficient conditions for any given individual’s being harmed by one or more events. This account entails, but is not entailed by, the counterfactual comparative account of harm. The chapter discusses how it can be the case that some events harm a given individual, even if none of those events individually is harmful. It proceeds to extend the basic view so that it accounts for the amount, or degree, of harm inflicted by an event or events, and also for the times at which, or during which, harmful events are harmful. It concludes by presenting a fully general account of overall and all-things-considered harm.

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Neil Feit
Fredonia State University

References found in this work

The preemption problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.
When is Death Bad, When it is Bad?John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2003-2017.

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