Challenging the Constitutive Rules Inviolability Dogma

Phenomenology and Mind 3:127-138 (2012)
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Abstract

According to Searle (1969) a constitutive rule creates the very possibility of the entity it rules. Later on, other scholars - such as Benoist (2003), Conte (1983), Guastini (1983) - pointed out the inviolability of constitutive rules. In this paper we want to challenge the inviolability dogma by asking the following question: is it possible to have violations of constitutive rules? We will argue that a parametrical approach to constitutive rules can do away with the inviolability dogma. As a result, our approach allows for violations and introduces two different ways of exiting a game (semantic exit vs. practical exit).

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Author Profiles

Guglielmo Feis
Università degli Studi di Milano
Umberto Sconfienza
Tilburg University

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References found in this work

Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Speech Acts.J. Searle - 1969 - Foundations of Language 11 (3):433-446.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.William P. Alston - 1970 - Philosophical Quarterly 20 (79):172-179.
Rules of language.Aaron Snyder - 1971 - Mind 80 (318):161-178.

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