Abstract

This paper is a defense of moral realism. It claims that Hume's projectivism and abuse of resultance has led us to gross distortions of non-cognitivist ethics. The analogy of moral properties with secondary properties is noted, before offering a stronger theory of moral realism. This theory recognises moral properties as constituting part of the manifest image, in a way that is satisfactory both ontologically and epistemologically This involves a rejection of austere, scientific reductionism. This model of moral realism relies on an analogy of moral properties as aspects. Aspect-seeing and moral value perception are argued to be linked, in a discussion of Wittgenstein's account of noticing aspects. Aspect blindness can best explain moral blindness, and bring out the connection with human possession and use of concepts. Moral value perception is a case of coming to see things in a certain light; as seeing human behaviour as HUMAN behaviour. Finally, I go on to argue that seeing is not just a matter of light waves of a certain frequency hitting our retina from an object that we passively see, but is a complex phenomena that can accommodate moral vision