Further Steps towards a Theory of Descriptions as Predicates

Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):91-109 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Descriptions are predicates. Here, I'll take this to mean either of two basically equivalent things: that they have extensions as their semantic values, sets of entities, in the broadest sense; or that they have type-〈e,t〉 functions as their semantic values, functions from entities, in the broadest sense, to truth values. An entity in the broadest sense is anything that can be the subject of a first-order predication. Examples are individuals, pluralities, masses, and kinds. Here I'm including entities in this broadest sense because my thesis that descriptions are predicates applies to all sorts of descriptions: singular descriptions, plural definite descriptions, mass descriptions, kind descriptions, and indefinite descriptions as well.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-19

Downloads
187 (#216,178)

6 months
34 (#262,366)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Delia Fara
Last affiliation: Princeton University

Citations of this work

A Review of Recanati’s Mental Files.Hsiang-Yun Chen - 2020 - NCCU Philosophical Journal 44:177-204.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Semantics in generative grammar.Irene Heim & Angelika Kratzer - 1998 - Malden, MA: Blackwell. Edited by Angelika Kratzer.
On Denoting.Bertrand Russell - 1905 - Mind 14 (56):479-493.
Introduction to mathematical philosophy.Bertrand Russell - 1919 - New York: Dover Publications.
Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Descriptions.Stephen Neale - 1990 - MIT Press.

View all 17 references / Add more references