Abstract

In recent work, Alex Gregory defends the unorthodox view that desires are beliefs about reasons for action. While Gregory offers compelling arguments in its defense, this paper critically examines how his desire-as-belief view can explain the phenomenon of recalcitrant desires. Taking inspiration from a debate about the cognitive status of emotions, I define recalcitrant desires as desires that persist despite the agent believing they have no reason to do what they desire. I argue that explaining the seeming irrationality involved in this type of recalcitrance presents a challenge to philosophical accounts of desire in general, and Gregory’s desire-as-belief view in particular. In Gregory’s framework, having a recalcitrant desire must ultimately be understood as simultaneously holding contradictory beliefs. Gregory embraces this conclusion and argues that it is simply a feature of our limited rationality, citing other examples of conflicting beliefs. I argue that these examples are misleading. Unlike normal conflicting beliefs, recalcitrant desires also persist despite the agent’s awareness of the conflict. Taking this into account, Gregory’s view cannot successfully explain recalcitrant desires because it must ascribe an implausible kind of contradiction.