Straight talk: Conceptions of sincerity in speech

Philosophical Studies 153 (2):213-234 (2011)
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Abstract

What is it for a speech act to be sincere? The most common answer amongst philosophers is that a speech act is sincere if and only if the speaker is in the state of mind that the speech act functions to express. However, a number of philosophers have advanced counterexamples purporting to demonstrate that having the expressed state of mind is neither necessary nor sufficient for speaking sincerely. One may nevertheless doubt whether these considerations refute the orthodox conception. Instead, it may be argued, they expose other ways of elucidating sincerity in speech. “Sincerity in speech” is ambivalent between a number of different conceptions. Against this background this paper presents two alternative conceptions, viz., Sincerity as Spontaneity and Sincerity as Presenting Oneself as one takes Oneself to be and develops a third conception which we may call Sincerity as a Communicative Virtue. This conception emphasizes the speaker’s intention in communicating her attitudes and the need to be properly justified in saying what one does

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John Eriksson
University of Gothenburg

Citations of this work

A Defense of Endorsement.Will Fleisher - forthcoming - In Mark Walker & Sanford Goldberg, Philosophy with Attitude. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lying and Certainty.Neri Marsili - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer, The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 170-182.
Insincerity.Andreas Stokke - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):496-520.
You don't say! Lying, asserting and insincerity.Neri Marsili - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Sheffield
How to Express Implicit Attitudes.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):251-272.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
How to do things with words.John L. Austin - 1962 - Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press. Edited by Marina Sbisá & J. O. Urmson.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Truth and Truthfulness: An Essay in Genealogy.Bernard Williams - 2002 - Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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