Abstract

It is well known that Kant used inductive arguments in his pre-critical philosophy, for example, in his 1764 Prize essay according to which metaphysics should follow Newton’s “analytic method” of natural science. However, his critical metaphysics of nature also uses several inductive tools, contrary to the widespread belief that his apriorism is only compatible with deductive reasoning. In this chapter, we pre- sent three cases of inductive reasoning found in his critical metaphys- ics of nature. First, Kant carries out an “experiment of pure reason” in Preface B of the Critique of Pure Reason to rule out transcendental realism via the cosmological antinomy. Second, he argues in the Ap- pendix to the Transcendental Dialectic that the transcendental ideas of traditional metaphysics can only serve as regulative principles for expanding our knowledge of nature, and he uses an inference to the best explanation (IBE) in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science. Third, at the end of the Critique, he claims that these prin- ciples support doctrinal belief. The chapter shows how each of these cases of inductive reasoning can be understood as a kind of IBE and discusses the significance of Kant’s arguments.