In defense of epicycles: Embracing complexity in psychological explanations

Mind and Language 38 (5):1208-1237 (2023)
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Abstract

Is formal simplicity a guide to learning in humans, as simplicity is said to be a guide to the acceptability of theories in science? Does simplicity determine the difficulty of various learning tasks? I argue that, similarly to how scientists sometimes preferred complex theories when this facilitated calculations, results from perception, learning and reasoning suggest that formal complexity is generally unrelated to what is easy to learn and process by humans, and depends on assumptions about available representational and processing primitives. “Simpler” hypotheses are preferred only when they are also easier to process. Historically, “simpler”, easier‐to‐process, scientific theories might also be preferred if they are transmitted preferentially. Empirically viable complexity measures should build on the representational and processing primitives of actual learners, even if explanations of their behaviour become formally more complex.

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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Logic and Conversation.H. Paul Grice - 1975 - In Donald Davidson, The logic of grammar. Encino, Calif.: Dickenson Pub. Co.. pp. 64-75.

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