Abstract

On a widely held view, we ought to perform an action just in case and because it is the one most strongly supported by reasons. When coupled with the thought that normativity is unified, this view commits us to the claim that we ought to adopt a doxastic attitude just in case and because it is the one most strongly supported by reasons. The problem, it has been said, is that this has implausible implications: that if one ought to believe p, one ought to believe any of the countless trivialities entailed by p. I argue that existing approaches to solving this problem fail and propose my own solution. It consists in arguing that, on said view of the epistemic ought, we ought to believe trivialities only once we have considered them. More broadly, the paper explains why we generally ought not clutter our minds with trivialities while nonetheless sometimes being required to believe them. It thereby highlights an underappreciated connection between norms of inquiry and norms of belief, as well as a way in which evidence for p can fail to constitute a reason to believe p.