Abstract

Susan Stebbing’s work in early 20th-century philosophy is notable for ranging over both academically-focused and public-facing work. While it may be tempting to see this “public philosophy” work as interesting purely as outreach, Stebbing seemingly saw this part of her work as more consequential, and with good reason. This applies in particular to her critique of what she saw as careless work on the implications of science for philosophical issues, pursued in detail in her 1937 book _Philosophy and the Physicists_. However in light of broad commitments to philosophical naturalism today, one may wonder whether Stebbing’s approach is defensible, or if it is unfairly dismissive of scientists’ perspectives. In this paper I re-examine Stebbing’s critique of popular science to trace the themes running through it, use this to defend her project against the charge of gatekeeping, and briefly consider possible lessons for contemporary discussion of philosophy and popular science. We proceed as follows: in §1 I briefly outline the context of Stebbing’s contribution to the debate, and sketch the problem this suggests: that in light of the widely accepted naturalistic stance in analytic philosophy today, Stebbing’s effort risks being a problematic instance of gatekeeping. In §2 I delve in detail into Stebbing’s critique, drawing out and assessing some repeating argumentative themes. In §3 I locate Stebbing’s views on popular science within her broader philosophical perspective, appealing to her work on the utility of logic. This helps confirm that Stebbing’s approach holds both scientists and philosophers to account for getting seduced into embracing deeply flawed positions by their passion for scientific developments, and thus should be considered guiding, not gatekeeping. Finally in §4 I consider whether Stebbing’s approach is relevant to the communication of philosophical and scientific ideas today.