Abstract

Reviews the book, The disorder of things: Metaphysical foundations of the disunity of science by John Dupré . The book is carefully woven around two central and interrelated theses. First is the denial that "science constitutes, or could ever come to constitute, a single, unified project," and the second is an "assertion of the extreme diversity of the contents of the world." Ultimately, Dupré wishes to contend that the second of his theses "shows the inevitability of the first." Overall, Dupré seeks to refute "one particularly notorious founding metaphor of modern science, the idea that the universe should be considered as a gigantic machine." In order to accomplish such a daunting task, he engages the reader in a lengthy and critical examination of three of the philosophical theses most closely associated with the mechanistic metaphor: Essentialism, Reductionism, and Determinism. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)