Abstract

In her account of science known as critical contextual empiricism (CCE), Helen Longino has famously argued that critical discursive interaction provides the very basis for the objectivity of science. While highly influential, CCE has also been criticized for being overly idealized, failing not only as a descriptive but also as a normative account of scientific institutions and practices. In this paper, we examine Longino’s social account of science from the vantage point of a conception of argumentation as epistemic exchange. We show that CCE does not explicitly problematize some important aspects of scientific practices, in particular: the costs and risks involved in extensive critical discursive interaction; the imperative of responsible collective workload management in a scientific community; and the need for mechanisms of curation and filtering in any sufficiently large epistemic community. The argumentation as epistemic exchange model retains the core idea of CCE, namely the centrality of critical discursive interaction in science, but incorporates aspects of scientific practice neglected by CCE (costs and risks, workload management, curation). Our analysis thus adapts CCE to situations where scientists are ‘busy people’ who must contend with limited resources (of time, energy, funding etc.). To illustrate our proposal, we discuss practices of peer review as instances of epistemic exchange. While highlighting the intrinsic vulnerabilities of the peer review system, we also offer some recommendations on how to improve it.