Abstract

In this paper, I address what a Pyrrhonian moral skeptic would say about the ‘now what’ debate amongst another set of moral skeptics, moral error theorists. The ‘now what’ debate stems from the ways error theorists try to solve the ‘now what’ problem of deciding what to do with moral discourse once error theory is accepted. Error theorists agree the criterion for solving the ‘now what’ problem must be motivated by a concern for achieving the most collectively or socially beneficial results from accepting error theory while yet not falling back into genuinely asserting full beliefs in nonexistent moral facts. The solutions they offer range from continuing to use morality as usual (conservationism), to eliminating morality altogether (abolitionism), to replacing genuinely asserting full beliefs in moral facts with quasi-asserting moral make-beliefs (fictionalism), and so on. By taking a Pyrrhonian perspective, I question the merely epistemic aims of error theory and the collectivist criterion for solving the ‘now what’ problem. I argue Pyrrhonian moral skepticism offers preferable solutions to the ‘now what’ problem because it is driven by a mostly individualist and therapeutic concern for avoiding the agitation and anxiety that attends morality. I call these solutions ‘nonassertive moral abolitionism’ and ‘reactionary moral fictionalism.’