Non-indexical contextualism, relativism and retraction

In Jeremy Wyatt, Julia Zakkou & Dan Zeman, Perspectives on Taste: Aesthetics, Language, Metaphysics, and Experimental Philosophy. Routledge (2022)
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Abstract

It is commonly held that retraction data, if they exist, show that assessment relativism is preferable to non-indexical contextualism. I argue that this is not the case. Whether retraction data have the suggested probative force depends on substantive questions about the proper treatment of tense and location. One’s preferred account in these domains should determine whether one accepts assessment relativism or non-indexical contextualism.

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Alexander Dinges
Freie Universität Berlin

References found in this work

Themes From Kaplan.Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.) - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Attitudes de dicto and de se.David Lewis - 1979 - Philosophical Review 88 (4):513-543.
Content Relativism and Semantic Blindness.Herman Cappelen - 2008 - In G. Carpintero & M. Koelbel, Relative Truth. Oxford University Press. pp. 265-86.

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