Abstract

This chapter explains Locke’s stance that we should examine our own powers of knowing before tackling the big metaphysical and moral questions, and analyzes his attack on the doctrine that basic logical, metaphysical, and moral principles are innately known. It argues that this attack is not directed against a straw man, and describes the motivation for it. It explains the difference between the “naïve” or occurrent version and the dispositional version of innatism and the difference between speculative principles and practical principles. It analyzes Locke’s critique of what he regards as the chief argument for innatism, the argument from universal consent. It expounds his critique of both occurrent innatism and dispositional innatism, and of both types of allegedly innate principles. It suggests that the attack on dispositional innatism needs to be supplemented by Locke’s positive view about the acquisition of our ideas in order to be compelling.