Toward Nature

In Schelling's late philosophy in confrontation with Hegel. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-58 (2023)
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Abstract

This chapter begins by examining the background to Schelling’s early work in Kant and Fichte. The key influence on a whole generation, Fichte seeks to makes Kant’s approach consistent, by deriving the conditions of experience simply from the self-positing “I.” However, his early philosophy is troubled by the problem of the relation between “transcendental idealism” and “empirical realism.” Fichte cannot decide whether the transcendental standpoint has metaphysical priority over the standpoint of life or is merely an explanatory device. Schelling’s early work seeks to resolve this oscillation, arguing that the structure of being and the structure of knowing must be identical, regarded absolutely. Correspondingly, in his emerging philosophy of nature, he shows, against Kant, that nature must be objectively teleological. Schelling’s “twin-track” conception, in which transcendental philosophy and the philosophy of nature are complementary, leads to a conflict with Fichte, which is fought out in their correspondence around the turn of the century. The two philosophers make valid criticisms of one another, which will influence their subsequent thinking.

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Peter Dews
University of Essex

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