Can Conservatism Mitigate the AI Alignment Problem?

Abstract

Conservative perspectives are substantially underrepresented within universities and other knowledge-producing institutions that educate many of the individuals responsible for developing and governing advanced artificial intelligence. This article argues that this underrepresentation may increase the risk of catastrophic AI misalignment—that is, forms of misalignment threatening humanity's continued existence and long-term flourishing—particularly in light of growing evidence that frontier AI systems exhibit a left-leaning political orientation. Specifically, it argues that several strands of conservative thought contain underappreciated normative resources for reducing this risk and may provide more robust protection against catastrophic forms of AI misalignment than rival traditions such as utilitarianism, liberalism, and socialism. First, nominal conservatism assigns special value to existing valuable entities. Since there are good reasons to think that various forms of intrinsic value depend on humanity's continued existence, this raises the justificatory threshold for actions that could result in humanity's extinction. Second, epistemic conservatism emphasizes caution under conditions of uncertainty, thereby reducing agents’ willingness to pursue interventions that impose even low-probability existential risks. Third, substantive forms of conservatism assign intrinsic value to human associations and their continuity across generations, providing additional reasons to preserve humanity and human civilization. The article concludes by outlining practical implications for AI development and governance, including promoting greater viewpoint diversity within academia and AI institutions and systematically evaluating AI systems for ideological blind spots.

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2026-07-14

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Bouke de Vries
Ghent University

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References found in this work

A theory of justice.John Rawls - 1999 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
What We Owe The Future.William MacAskill - 2023 - New York: Basic Books.
On Nationality.David Miller - 1995 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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