Against the Right to Work, For the Right to Contribute

Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 30 (5):673-696 (2025)
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Abstract

Is there a universal right to access some form of monetary income? And if so, what exactly does this right entitle one to? In the debate between establishing a right to work versus a universal basic income (UBI), defenders of the former sometimes appeal to the additional nonpecuniary benefits of work. In this article, I argue that the nonpecuniary benefits of work cannot serve as grounds to justify establishing a right to work rather than a UBI. To show this, I propose that rights must pass tests of efficacy and efficiency if we are to be justified in recognizing them. I then set aside the efficacy and efficiency of the right to work relative to our pecuniary interests and ask instead whether it displays these features in relation to a particular set of nonpecuniary interests. Ultimately, I show that the right to work is both ineffective at promoting these interests and inefficient when compared against a right to contribute without remuneration. As such, the nonpecuniary benefits of work give us little reason to prefer the establishment of a right to work when compared against some combination of a UBI and a right to contribute. The remainder of the article makes a positive case for recognizing a right to contribute by demonstrating the efficacy and efficiency of such a right in relation to certain nonpecuniary interests.

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2025-09-07

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Jordan Desmond
Queen's University

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Global justice, reciprocity, and the state.Andrea Sangiovanni - 2007 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 35 (1):3–39.
[no title].Kimberley Brownlee - 2020 - Oxford University Press.
Thesis Eleven: In transition.Peter Beilharz & Sian Supski - 2021 - Thesis Eleven 163 (1):3-4.

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