Single scoreboard semantics

Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2):1-21 (2004)
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Abstract

What happens to the "conversational score" when speakers in a conversation push the score for a context-sensitive term in different directions? In epistemology, contextualists are often construed as holding that both the skeptic ("You don't know!") and her opponent ("Oh, yes I do!") speak truthfully when they debate. This assumes a "multiple scoreboards" version of contextualism. But contextualists themselves typically opt for "single scoreboard" views on which such apparently competing claims really do conflict. This paper explores several single scoreboard options for contextualists, opting in the end for the "gap view," on which neither of our debaters speaks truthfully.

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Keith DeRose
Yale University

Citations of this work

Context shifting arguments.Ernie Lepore & Herman Cappelen - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):25–50.
Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Disagreements about taste.Timothy Sundell - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):267-288.

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References found in this work

Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Cambridge University Press. Edited by Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Elusive Knowledge.David Lewis - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield, Skepticism: Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.

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