Truth consequentialism, withholding and proportioning belief to the evidence

Philosophical Issues 14 (1):91–112 (2004)
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Michael DePaul
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Epistemic Normativity.Stephen Grimm - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 243-264.
Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In David K. Henderson & John Greco, Epistemic Evaluation: Purposeful Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
Junk Beliefs and Interest‐Driven Epistemology.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):568-583.
Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.

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References found in this work

Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin I. Goldman - 1999 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.
Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
Epistemic desiderata.William P. Alston - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (3):527-551.

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