On metaphysical explanations of psychological asymmetries

In Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack & Alison Fernandes, Temporal Asymmetries in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2022)
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Abstract

What is the relation between metaphysical and psychological insights into temporal asymmetries? This chapter examines that question on the basis of a case study concerning the temporal Doppler effect (Caruso, Van Boven, Chin, & Ward, 2013). Caruso et al. propose that future events seem closer than past ones at an equal objective temporal distance because we experience subjective movement through time. I explore ways of interpreting their discussion in the light of the metaphysical debate between A- and B-theorists over whether time really passes and whether the future is genuinely ‘open’ while the past is ‘fixed’. I argue for the following claims: (1) Caruso et al.’s talk of a subjective movement through time seems best interpreted as concerning our longer term cognitive relationship to time; (2) both A- and B-theoretic interpretations of their discussion are viable as interpretations; (3) if combined with Priorean arguments for the A-theory, it takes some work to make sure the A-theoretic interpretation respects Van Boven and Caruso’s constraint that the objective temporal distance cannot directly influence psychological outcomes without influencing psychological intermediaries; and (4) a third, less metaphysically loaded interpretation may be preferable to both the A- and the B-theoretic ones.

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Natalja Deng
Yonsei University

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References found in this work

What Makes Time Special?Craig Callender - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Experiencing Time.Simon Prosser - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.
Presentism, eternalism, and the growing block.Kristie Miller - 2013 - In Adrian Bardon & Heather Dyke, A Companion to the Philosophy of Time. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 345-364.
Intentional Objects.Tim Crane - 2001 - Ratio 14 (4):298-317.

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