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Heterophenomenology reconsidered
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):247-270 (2007)
Abstract
Descartes’ Method of Radical Doubt was not radical enough. –A. Marcel (2003, 181) In short, heterophenomenology is nothing new; it is nothing other than the method that has been used by psychophysicists, cognitive psychologists, clinical neuropsychologists, and just about everybody who has ever purported to study human consciousness in a serious, scientific way. –D. Dennett (2003, 22)Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
The elephant and the blind: the experience of pure consciousness: philosophy, science, and 500+ experiential reports.Thomas Metzinger - 2024 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
The genuine problem of consciousness.Anthony I. Jack, Philip Robbins, Jared Friedman & Andreas Roepstorff - forthcoming - In Antonino Raffone, _Consciousness: A comprehensive reference_, 2nd edition.
Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience.Richard Brown (ed.) - 2013 - Dordrecht: Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.
The empirical case against introspection.Rik Peels - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2461-2485.
How You Know You’re Conscious: Illusionism and Knowledge of Things.Matt Duncan - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (1):185-205.
References found in this work
Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel Dennett - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.
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