On the manipulator-focused response to manipulation cases

Philosophical Studies 181 (11):2867-2896 (2024)
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Abstract

In this paper, we identify a class of responses to cases of manipulation that we label manipulator-focused views. The key insight of such views is that being subject to the will of another agent significantly affects our freedom and moral responsibility. Though different authors take this key insight in different directions, and the mechanics of their views are quite different, these views turn out to share many key components, and this allows us to discuss several authors’ views at the same time, highlighting a variety of challenges for such views and helping to identify pitfalls to avoid in further developments of views of this type. Moreover, as we survey manipulator-focused views and the challenges that plague them, we go beyond the typical problem cases for such views—natural force variations of manipulation cases—and introduce several new manipulation cases. We conclude by comparing the prospects for this family of views with its main rival, namely bypassing views.

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Author Profiles

Gabriel De Marco
University of Oxford
Taylor W. Cyr
Samford University

References found in this work

Free will, agency, and meaning in life.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press.
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S.Giuliano Campioni, Paolo D'Iorio, Maria Christina Fornari, Francesco Fronterotta & Andrea Orsucci - 2003 - In Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche, G. Campioni & Renate Müller-Buck, Nietzsches persönliche Bibliothek. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter. pp. 514-583.

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