Fundamental and Non-Fundamental Beliefs In Terms of Epistemic Architecture

van İlahiyat Dergisi 12 (20):60-73 (2024)
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Abstract

In fundamental beliefs, in other words, in the internalist theory of knowledge, our beliefs are guaranteed by solid mental foundations, unshakable premises, epistemic principles and some reasons that lead to truth. However, in the theory of non-fundamental beliefs, that is, externalism, the conditions that guarantee knowledge are generally sought outside the mind. Now, in the epistemological sense, obtainingin formation by chance or situations that will eliminate error in information are not the kind of evidence or some principles present in the mind that foundationalists put forward; Cognitive resources such as perception, memory, introspection should also be taken into account in the expression of non-core beliefs. Accordingly, according to a non-foundationalist understanding of knowledge, belief is generally justifiedif it is the result of a reliable mental process such as standard perceptual processes, remembering states in terms of stored data, and introspection, and if there is nothing that weakens this reliable mental process. While the knowledge obtained based on basic beliefs is expressed with justified and perhaps even guaranteed true beliefs, reliable/causal cognitive and external processes are also taken into account in the transformation of non-basic beliefs in to knowledge. The importance of this study emerges as it aims to investigate the plausibility of fundamental and non-fundamental beliefs from the context of knowledge construction by investigating the issue from two dimension sand trying to produce a synthesis. In addition, it aims to justify both types of beliefs and secure knowledge within the framework of internalist and externalist theories of knowledge. Fundamental and non-fundamental belief forms have been described and partially compared within the framework of internalist and externalist understandings of knowledge, and this study has been prepared from a research and analysis perspective. The scope and limitation level of this study is related to the role of our beliefs in the construction of knowledge. While basic beliefs are expressed based on basic epistemic principles and solid mental foundations, non-basic beliefs are explained based on both cognitive and external sources such as perception, memory, introspection, experience and reliability. Th eproblematics of this study are generally about how basic and non-basic beliefs are distinguished and expressed, and which elements are used to guarantee knowledge. The study first tried to define and compare basic and non-basic beliefs. Afterwards, he tried to find solutions to the problems of this research by considering the relationship of both forms of belief with knowledge.

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References found in this work

What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In [no title]. pp. 1-23.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske, Knowledge: Readings in Contemporary Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Knowing.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1982 - Univ Of Minnesota Press.
Is justified true belief knowledge?Edmund L. Gettier - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn, Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 121--3.
Why social epistemology is real epistemology.Alvin I. Goldman - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock, Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-29.

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