Abstract

This paper reconstructs and critically examines Helmut Walther’s rejection of gene-centered evolutionary explanations as presented in Metaphysics and Evolution (2010) and Philosophy and Biology (2015). Walther draws on systems biology, epigenetics, and anti-reductionist arguments—particularly associated with Denis Noble—to argue that genes lack explanatory priority in evolution. The analysis shows that this critique systematically conflates proximate developmental mechanisms with ultimate evolutionary explanations and relies on underdetermined key concepts such as “reductionism,” “causation,” and “genetic centrality.” By failing to distinguish clearly between mechanisms of development and levels of selection and inheritance, Walther’s arguments target simplified or outdated versions of gene-centered theory rather than its contemporary formulations. Drawing on established positions in evolutionary biology and philosophy of biology, the paper argues that systems biology and epigenetic regulation are fully compatible with a modern, non-naive gene-centered perspective, provided that proximate and ultimate explanatory levels are kept distinct. It is further shown that several authors invoked by Walther, including Mario Bunge and Barbara McClintock, do not support the conclusions drawn from their work. The paper concludes that Walther’s critique neither undermines the role of genes as carriers of heritable information nor offers a coherent alternative evolutionary framework.