The ethics of using or not using statistical prediction rules in psychological practice and related consulting activities

Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3):S178-S184 (2002)
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Abstract

Professionals often believe that they must “exercise judgment” in making decisions critical to other people’s lives. The relative superiority of statistical prediction rules to intuitive judgment for combining incomparable sources of information to predict important human outcomes leads us to question this personal input belief. Some professionals hence use SPR’s to “educate” intuitive judgment, rather than replace it. In psychology in particular, such amalgamation is not justified. If a well‐validated SPR that is superior to professional judgment exists in a relevant decision making context, professionals should use it, totally absenting themselves from the prediction.

Other Versions

reprint Dawes, Robyn M. (2002) "The Ethics of Using or Not Using Statistical Prediction Rules in Psychological Practice and Related Consulting Activities". Philosophy of Science 69(S3):S178-S184

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