Bradley and the impossibility of absolute truth

History and Philosophy of Logic 2 (1-2):25-39 (1981)
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Abstract

Bradley thought that there is a connexion between the theory of reality and the theory of truth. The theory of reality to which he subscribed, Monism, rules out a correspondence theory of truth, he thought, since it denies the existence of a plurality of facts, or things, in virtue of correspondence to which a judgment could be true. But though he rejects the correspondence theory he insists on the independence of truth from belief, wish and hope. For him the test of truth is coherence, which has two aspects, system and comprehensiveness. However, he does not think that this test yields ‘absolute’ truth. This, he maintains, for at least three different reasons, is unobtainable. Judgments can only be partially true. However, since there are degrees of truth, some judgments are closer to the truth than others, even though none are, or could be, unconditionally true.

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David Holdcroft
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Russell's Logicism versus Oxbridge Logics, 1890-1925.I. Grattan-Guinness - 1985 - Russell: The Journal of Bertrand Russell Studies 5 (2):101-131.

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References found in this work

Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay.Francis Herbert Bradley - 1893 - London, England: Oxford University Press.
Popper’s qualitative theory of verisimilitude.David Miller - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):166-177.
Philosophical Essays.Bertrand Russell - 2014 - New York: Routledge.
Essays on Truth and Reality.Francis Herbert Bradley - 1914 - Oxford, England: Cambridge University Press.

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