Why being fragments

Synthese 202 (6):1-18 (2023)
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Abstract

This paper develops a new argument for ontological pluralism—the thesis that being fragments. The argument goes, roughly, as follows. It is conceivable that some beings are ontologically dissimilar. So, it is possible that some beings are ontologically dissimilar. This is sufficient for ontological pluralism. So, being fragments.

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Citations of this work

Metaontology.Kris McDaniel - 2025 - Cambridge University Press.

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 2001 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Does conceivability entail possibility.David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne, Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 145--200.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
P. - 2008 - In Michael Inwood, A Hegel Dictionary. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 212-237.

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