Resolving Conceptual Conflicts through Voting

Foundations of Science 29 (3):773-788 (2024)
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Abstract

Scientific activities strongly depend on concepts and classifications to represent the world in an orderly and workable manner. This creates a trade-off. On the one hand, it is important to leave space for conceptual and classificatory criticism. On the other hand, agreement on which concepts and classifications to use, is often crucial for communication and the integration of research and ideas. In this paper, we show that this trade-off can sometimes best be resolved through conceptual governance, in which scientific institutions set a collective conceptual standard, and that voting can be a reasonable way to implement that governance. Voting is a means to aggregate among conflicting values, preferences and priorities that often underpin conceptual or classificatory debates, all while signaling ongoing disagreement. We also discuss how the legitimacy of the voting process and its outcome can be ensured.

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References found in this work

The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
What is Conceptual Engineering and What Should it Be?David Chalmers - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63.
Conceptual Engineering and the Politics of Implementation.Matthieu Queloz & Friedemann Bieber - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (3):670-691.
Conceptual control: On the feasibility of conceptual engineering.Eugen Fischer - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
Is semantics possible?Hilary Putnam - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (3):187–201.

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