Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism, by David Enoch

Mind 121 (484):1059-1064 (2012)
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10.1093/mind/fzs093

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Terence Cuneo
University of Vermont

Citations of this work

Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 10. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 104-133.
Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 10. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 104-133.
Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification.Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 104-133.

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