Impartiality, Fairness, and Beneficence

In The Moral Demands of Affluence. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK (2006)
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Abstract

Showing that the Extreme Demand can be rejected from an appropriately impartial point of view would constitute a decisive objection to it. This would undermine the case for thinking that it could be a demand of either fairness or beneficence. An ‘appropriately’ impartial point of view, for the purposes of this argument, is a point of view of impartial concern for other people’s interests.

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Garrett Cullity
Australian National University

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