Abstract

Maximising act-consequentialists think that only the best will do: that we are required to select one of the available options with the highest value, or highest expected value, when faced with a choice. Satisficing act-consequentialists hold that sometimes it is permitted to select options with less than the highest value, or highest expected value. Debates between maximisers and satificers remain unresolved. This paper explores a third, contextualist option: the only permissible options are among the best, but contextual standards determine whether "the best" options are greater or equal in value (/expected value) to the other available options, or whether they include some of the very-good-but-not-maximal in value options. This contextualist option can elegantly accommodate many of the considerations deployed both on the maximising and satisficing sides of the debate. This kind of contexualism about expressions like "right" or "permitted", in moral contexts, may be a non-obvious contextualism, in that competent speakers may be unaware of it. It is argued that this is less of a drawback than one might think. Finally, the question is addressed of whether this view would make moral deliberation too sensitive to the linguistic context in which it might be carried out.