Smith

In Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-Interest in British Moral Philosophy From Hobbes to Bentham. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 158-169 (2019)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher Adam Smith (1723–90). Smith’s theory of sympathy is explained. The notion of the impartial spectator is discussed, in connection with both propriety and utility, and it is shown how the view of the spectator itself incorporates certain aspects of the human point of view. Smith is claimed to be a deontologist, at least concerning human ethics. His version of the dualism of practical reason is outlined, and the difficulties of combining a utilitarian conception of God with the notion of divine retribution are noted.

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