Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37 (2014)
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Abstract

The debate over whether free will and determinism are compatible is controversial, and produces wide scholarly discussion. This paper argues that recent studies in experimental philosophy suggest that people are in fact “natural compatibilists”. To support this claim, it surveys the experimental literature bearing directly or indirectly upon this issue, before pointing to three possible limitations of this claim. However, notwithstanding these limitations, the investigation concludes that the existing empirical evidence seems to support the view that most people have compatibilist intuitions.

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Author Profiles

Florian Cova
University of Geneva
Yasuko Kitano
University of Tokyo

References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.
An experimental philosophy manifesto.Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols, Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 3--14.

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