Discussion: A defense of Bechtel and Mundale

Philosophy of Science 71 (2):198-204 (2004)
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Abstract

Kim claims that Bechtel and Mundale's case against multiple realization depends on the wrong kind of evidence. The latter argue that neuroscientific practice shows neural states across individuals and species are type identical. Kim replies that the evidence they cite to support this is irrelevant. I defend Bechtel and Mundale by showing why the evidence they cite is relevant and shows multiple realization does not occur.

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Citations of this work

Multiple realizability.John Bickle - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Multiple realization in comparative perspective.Mark B. Couch - 2009 - Biology and Philosophy 24 (4):505-519.
Content internalism and conceptual engineering.Joey Pollock - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11587-11605.
Two Confusions Concerning Multiple Realization.Thomas W. Polger - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (5):537-547.

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References found in this work

Psychological predicates.Hilary Putnam - 1967 - In William H. Capitan & Daniel Davy Merrill, Art, mind, and religion. [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press. pp. 37--48.
Nonreductive materialism and the explanatory autonomy of psychology.Terence E. Horgan - 1993 - In Steven J. Wagner & Richard Wagner, Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal. University of Notre Dame Press.

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